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PERSPECTIVES ON RELIGIOUS FUNDAMENTALISM AND
FAMILIES IN THE U.S.

Vivian E. Hamilton*

The Institute of Bill of Rights Law sponsored this symposium as a forum (1) for
exploring the nature and exercise of fundamentalist religion in the U.S., (2) for better
understanding fundamentalist families, and (3) for examining the role of the state
when religious exercise, family autonomy, and individual rights collide. The group
of academics that gathered at the William and Mary School of Law in November 2009
comprised some of the nation’s foremost scholars of the First Amendment’s religion
clauses, family law, and American religious history and culture. Their contributions,
first at the symposium and again in this issue, help us to think more deeply about absolutist beliefs in a pluralist society, to better evaluate current conflicts and anticipate
others that might loom, and to participate in devising better paths forward.
The essays here pursue three broad themes. The first one is the meaning and
import of “fundamentalism” itself—or at least the American version of it. Randall
Balmer, Andrew Koppelman, and Frederick Gedicks turn their attention to this
question.
Randall Balmer, a professor of American religious history at Barnard College,
Columbia University, provides essential historical and cultural context in Fundamentalism, the First Amendment, and the Rise of the Religious Right.1 Balmer describes early nineteenth-century evangelical Baptists’ enthusiastic support of Thomas
Jefferson and of the separation of church and state embodied in the First Amendment.
Balmer then explains how American fundamentalism emerged in the early twentieth
century as a conservative response to the rise of theological liberalism in mainline
Protestant denominations. And he notes the irony of contemporary efforts by the
Religious Right (whose own success was, of course, made possible by the “free
market of religion” guaranteed by the First Amendment) to collapse the distinction
between church and state through efforts including advocacy of prayer in public
schools, taxpayer vouchers for religious schools, faith-based initiatives, and religious
symbols and monuments in public spaces.
Frederick Gedicks takes a philosophical approach to understanding American
fundamentalism in God of Our Fathers, Gods for Ourselves: Fundamentalism and
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Postmodern Belief.2 He begins his analysis with the postmodern condition. The
(our) postmodern condition is defined by the absence of “metanarrative”; in other
words, the failure of philosophical, scientific, or religious approaches to provide a
comprehensive and universally acceptable explanation of life or the world. Gedicks
views American religious fundamentalists as having rejected postmodernism and the
pluralism it implies. Instead, they believe that they possess the only truth. While
religious fundamentalists are not unique in making this sort of claim, Gedicks argues
that what distinguishes them is that “they know this truth and the God that guarantees
it with such reliability and confidence that they are impelled to structure society around
it.” American fundamentalism thus embraces the alignment of government with “true
religion”—not as a nation that goes so far as to suppresses dissent, but as a Christian
nation that tolerates dissenters. Gedicks himself embraces the postmodern condition
and implicitly chides fundamentalists not only for their certitude, but also for the hubris
inherent in their attempts to imbue American secular society with public religion.
In his essay The Nonproblem of Fundamentalism,3 Andrew Koppelman shows
greater faith than do Balmer and Gedicks in American fundamentalists’ commitment
to the separation of church and state. Koppelman describes fundamentalism as essentially “a strategy of biblical interpretation.” To the extent that there is a connection
between fundamentalists and a particular political commitment (i.e., the policies of
the conservative right), such a connection is contingent—not inevitable. Koppelman
argues against using fundamentalism as a meaningful category when examining
issues of public concern. Instead, the focus should remain exclusively on the issues
themselves. For example, policymakers concerned with the inadequate education
provided some homeschooled children ought not focus on fundamentalist homeschoolers (perhaps because they have become an increasingly large proportion of
homeschoolers), but instead on inadequate homeschooling itself. Indeed, Koppelman
warns that using fundamentalism as a proxy for what he terms “a retrograde politics”
risks alienating potential fundamentalist allies.
The second theme that emerges from the essays in this issue is that too much
religious deference can pose significant social risk—especially to women and children.
The essays contributed by Robin Fretwell Wilson, Marci Hamilton, and Catherine
Ross all demonstrate how the liberal commitment to respecting religious belief and
exercise can result in the state’s unwittingly abdicating its basic responsibilities
towards all of its citizens.
Robin Fretwell Wilson makes this point using examples from abroad. She
explains in Privatizing Family Law in the Name of Religion how Great Britain and
Western Thrace (a semi-independent region in Greece) both permit Muslim Sharía
courts applying Islamic law to adjudicate family disputes.4 Wilson then chronicles the
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myriad ways in which Islamic rules governing divorce, child custody, and inheritance
leave women significantly worse off than they would be under the countries’ civil laws.
Wilson notes that the religious law’s harsh treatment of women at divorce—upon which
they face near-certain impoverishment and loss of custody of their children—can
effectively trap them in violent, nonfunctioning marriages. And many religious leaders
to whom women turn for guidance admit that they uniformly discourage women—
including those who are victims of family violence—from exiting marriage. Wilson
concludes by cautioning that “[b]inding women who want to exit a marriage to a religious community’s norms . . . will erect a barrier to exit for many women and prevent
them from privately regulating conduct toward themselves and their children.”
Marci Hamilton turns our attention to children in the U.S. who have been sexually abused by religious clergy or by way of their membership in religious organizations. Her essay, The ‘Licentiousness’ in Religious Organizations and Why It Is
Not Protected Under Religious Liberty Constitutional Provisions, highlights both
the sexual abuse committed by Roman Catholic priests and the sexual abuse endemic
to polygamous Mormon communities.5 Hamilton first explores some of the reasons
the state has failed to protect children from this abuse. Among them is the intentional secrecy of some religious organizations, including the Catholic and Mormon
Churches, especially with respect to wrongdoing by their members. A result is that
misconduct is not reported to state authorities but instead handled (or mishandled, or
buried) internally. Another factor hindering the state’s ability to protect children is
the invocation by religious organizations of religious liberty guarantees to defend their
actions—a strategy Hamilton rightly criticizes as “perverse.” At least as perverse is
the conclusion by courts in a minority of states that religious liberty guarantees indeed
apply as defenses to abuse claims. These courts believed that the claims required them
to assess the characteristics of a “reasonable member of the clergy,” and their resolution would thus result in the “excessive entanglement between courts and religious
doctrine.” Hamilton then suggests that the religious liberty claims of polygamous
groups raise a “slightly more interesting issue,” since their sexual practices—which
routinely involve statutory rape, forced marriage, and bigamous marriage—are dictated by their religious beliefs, unlike the sexual abuse perpetrated by Catholic clergy.
She then refutes those claims with dispatch by surveying the history of state and federal religious liberty doctrine, including the explicit exclusion of “licentiousness,”
or illicit sex, from religious liberty protections. Because “illicit sexual conduct . . .
is unprotected religious conduct, whether the conduct is religiously motivated or not,”
the state’s obligation to protect children from entrenched sexual abuse, whatever its
motivation or justification, remains undiminished.
In Fundamentalist Challenges to Core Democratic Values: Exit and Homeschooling, Catherine Ross argues against state deference to parents who, for religious
reasons, homeschool their children to inculcate in them unquestioning acceptance
5
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of their parents’ absolutist belief system.6 Ross begins by chronicling the history of
homeschooling in the U.S. She notes that homeschooling is a relatively recent trend,
led in the 1980s and 1990s by conservative and religious families who objected to
what they viewed as a secular bias in public schools that undermined their fundamentalist belief systems. Today, homeschooling is dominated by conservative Christians.
Ross acknowledges that conservative Christians who homeschool are not a monolithic
group and that some may expose their children to other beliefs, but she also notes
studies demonstrating that many parents choose homeschooling precisely because
they do not want their children exposed to diverse viewpoints. And, Ross argues, by
withdrawing their children from the public sphere and shielding them from other viewpoints, such parents deny their children the civics education that lies at the core of
liberal democracy. She reasons that the state’s interest in the education of homeschooled children should thus extend beyond the three R’s to also include “the civics
education goals of the state, including lessons on mutual respect for diverse populations and viewpoints.” Because democracy relies for its effective functioning on citizens who share certain civic norms, such as tolerance for diversity, Ross concludes
that “the states’ interest in educating children for life in a pluralist democracy trumps
any asserted parental liberty interest in controlling children’s education.”
The third theme is perhaps the murkiest. It involves the constitutionality, propriety,
and desirability of facially secular policies whose motivations are clearly religious—
questions addressed here by June Carbone and Naomi Cahn, and John Taylor. In their
essay Embryo Fundamentalism, Carbone and Cahn consider what they view to be the
distinct (undesirable) possibility that religiously derived views on the status of human
embryos will shape future legislation regulating assisted reproduction technologies
(ART).7 In Family Values, Courts, and Culture War: The Case of Abstinence-Only
Sex Education, Taylor considers abstinence-only sex education, which, he argues,
promotes a normative family vision that is “recognizably part of a religiously conservative worldview.”8
Embryo Fundamentalism addresses an issue that Carbone and Cahn caution may
extend the abortion fight into the sphere of assisted reproduction: the disposition of the
hundreds of thousands of excess embryos created through in vitro fertilization (IVF)
and currently stored in the freezers of fertility clinics around the country. Carbone and
Cahn observe that imposing pragmatic legal infrastructure on the virtually unregulated
fertility industry could be beneficial, and might improve the safety and effectiveness
of ART. But they also note legislation’s potential to give effect to a comprehensive
theological/moral approach that treats embryos as human beings from the moment of
conception—an approach Carbone and Cahn call “embryo fundamentalism.” Embryo
fundamentalism shares the religious origins of the anti-abortion movement, whose
6
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historical growth Carbone and Cahn recount. While abortion was originally viewed as
a Roman Catholic issue, with the Catholic Church leading “the development of a comprehensive theological approach to the treatment of embryos as human beings,” the
anti-abortion movement spread and gained support from other conservative Christian
denominations. The anti-abortion movement’s absolute commitment to the belief
that human life begins at conception, Carbone and Cahn argue, will surely shape the
debates involving assisted reproduction. They describe and compare legislation
adopted in several states, with Louisiana and California anchoring either end of the
ideological spectrum. Legislation passed in Louisiana, for example, declares embryos
to be “juridical persons” until implantation, prohibits their intentional destruction, and
provides for embryo donation and “adoption.” California, on the other hand, has
passed legislation that requires fertility clinics to provide their patients with a comprehensive list of embryo disposition options. Carbone and Cahn thus express concern that, influenced by the absolutism of embryo fundamentalists, future regulatory
schemes could “create a fundamentalist infrastructure for the oversight of assisted
reproduction to the exclusion of other views.” If legislation gave effect to such views,
the result could be “[t]he potential redefinition of constitutionally protected reproductive rights and family integrity.” Carbone and Cahn derive some reassurance, however, from the fact that those who reliably oppose abortion are less united in their
opposition to various aspects of ART; they thus remain hopeful that fundamentalists
will continue to prefer “rhetoric over action.”
John Taylor addresses abstinence-only sex education in public schools, which
is objectionable to many, he notes, for two primary reasons: First, it is religiously
motivated. And second, it is demonstrably less effective than comprehensive sex
education at reducing pregnancy and sexually transmitted diseases and is thus bad
policy. Taylor explores the claims that those on the “sexual left” view sex education
as a public health issue (and presumably avoid reliance on their personal, subjective
values), while those on the “sexual right” see it as a values issue (and presumably
allow their subjective, religious values to dictate their policy preference). Taylor rejects the dichotomy, however, and concludes that their approaches to sex education
express the “values” of both the left and right. He then turns briefly to the question
of whether facially secular sex education runs afoul of the Establishment Clause.
While he views the question as a close one, he nonetheless finds it “quite difficult to
show that a policy neither declaring religious truth nor requiring a religious observance violates the Establishment Clause.” Taylor ultimately expresses more strongly
his discomfort with the position that abstinence-only education is unconstitutional,
cautioning that “judicial invalidation of facially secular abstinence education would
come perilously close to invalidating policies simply because they are religiously
motivated.” In an area traditionally controlled by state and local governments, he
instead urges that the federal government’s approach should be one of detachment,
with its involvement limited perhaps to funding programs that demonstrate effectiveness. To be clear, however, Taylor does not embrace abstinence-only sex education
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as good policy. To his mind, “the problem with (at least most forms of) abstinence
education is not that they are ‘too religious’ to satisfy the Establishment Clause, but
that they conscript the public schools as strategic tools in culture war.”
In urging restraint before bringing the power of the federal government down
on the side of the “sexual left” and against religious fundamentalists or the “sexual
right,” Taylor implicitly warns his (predominantly secular?) readers against making
the same absolutist mistake with which religious fundamentalists are charged. His
warning recalls Frederick Gedicks’s prescient counsel—“the best safeguard of liberty
in a pluralist democracy, [is] a constant and present and humble sense of being not
quite sure that one is right.”

